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CORNEA AND CLOSURE
Andrew Graham and Stephen Maitzen
Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the conclu-
sion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who several 
years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access,” or 
“CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of atheistic arguments 
from evil ever since. Despite numerous criticisms aimed at CORNEA in recent 
years, the principle continues to be invoked and defended. We raise a new 
objection: CORNEA is false because it entails intolerable violations of closure.
Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the con-
clusion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who 
several years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic 
Access,” or “CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of athe-
istic arguments from evil ever since.1 Despite numerous criticisms aimed 
at CORNEA in recent years, the principle continues to be invoked and 
defended.2 We raise a new objection: CORNEA is false because it entails 
intolerable violations of closure.
Wykstra oﬀ ers CORNEA as a necessary condition for one’s being
entitled to assert claims of the form “It appears that p.” He seeks to
retain the virtues of Richard Swinburne’s account of “the ‘seems so, is so’ 
presumption” while rejecting what he regards as Swinburne’s arbitrary 
distinction between “positive” and “negative” seemings, a distinction he 
derides as “Swinburne’s Slip”: “Since the distinction between positive and 
negative seemings depends so much upon formulation, it is hard to see 
how it can have the epistemic bite Swinburne gives it.”3 His alternative, 
CORNEA, runs as follows:
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim “It 
appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her 
cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not 
the case, s would likely be diﬀ erent than it is in some way discernible 
by her.4
According to Wykstra, CORNEA applies to the “epistemic” sense of 
“appears” rather than to the merely phenomenal sense of the word; in 
the epistemic sense of “It appears that p,” he writes, “I take there to be an 
evidential connection between what I am inclined to believe (namely, that 
p) and the cognized situation that inclines me to believe it.”5 He concludes 
that atheistic arguments containing premisses of the form “It appears 
that such-and-such evil is pointless” (such William L. Rowe’s well-known 
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argument from evil) cannot even get started, since CORNEA prevents any 
human being from properly asserting even the apparent pointlessness of 
any instance of evil. Why? Because, says Wykstra, the purposes of an om-
niscient God, if there is one, in permitt ing evil probably fall outside our 
limited ken; thus it is not reasonable for any of us to believe that we would 
always see the point of God’s permitt ing evil even if it always had a point. 
Granted, the agonizing and terminal suﬀ ering of a fawn burned in a re-
mote forest fi re6 may seem to serve no greater good, but it would seem that 
way to us even if it served a greater good that we are too ignorant to detect. 
So, on CORNEA, we have no business saying it appears to be pointless, in 
the epistemic sense of “appears,” and without even apparently pointless 
evil to invoke, standard evidential arguments from evil founder.
Critics have raised various objections to CORNEA, but none, as far as 
we know, have focused adequately on the subjunctive conditional clause 
in Wykstra’s principle: “if p were not the case, s would likely be diﬀ erent 
than it is in some way discernible by [H].” This clause closely resembles 
the well-known subjunctive “sensitivity” condition on knowledge7 cham-
pioned by Dretske and Nozick, and its presence in CORNEA therefore 
poses a familiar problem: satisfaction of CORNEA will fail to be closed 
under known implication. For instance, a subject H can satisfy CORNEA 
for “It appears to H that (p & q)” while failing to satisfy CORNEA for “It 
appears to H that p,” even when H knows, as H typically will, that (p & q) 
implies p. CORNEA thus violates closure, a defect many regard as fatal for 
those analyses of knowledge on which knowledge must be sensitive.
Let “R” denote the proposition that you are an embodied person who 
is reading right now, and let “BIV” denote the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, 
according to which you have recently and unknowingly become a disem-
bodied brain-in-a-vat being electrochemically fed exactly the experiences 
you are now having. BIV is deliberately designed to make its truth indistin-
guishable, by you, from its falsity. Presumably, you now satisfy CORNEA 
for asserting
(1) It appears that (R & ~BIV),
because if (R & ~BIV) were false, R would be the only false conjunct, and 
you would discern its falsity: in the closest possible worlds in which (R 
& ~BIV), you are an embodied person whose experiences make you aware 
that you are doing something other than reading right now (maybe you’ve 
just put aside this essay). Hence it is reasonable for you to believe that, 
given your cognitive faculties and the use you have made of them, if (R & 
~BIV) were not the case, things would look diﬀ erent to you from the way 
they now look. However, while you satisfy CORNEA for (1) and also for
(2) It appears that R
(since, as before, if R were not the case, things would look diﬀ erent to 
you), you fail CORNEA for
(3) It appears that ~BIV.
Again, BIV stipulates that you cannot perceptually distinguish worlds 
where you are a brain-in-a-vat from worlds where you are normally 
embodied. Apprised of this stipulation, you cannot reasonably believe that, 
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given your cognitive faculties and the use you have made of them, if BIV 
were the case then your “cognized situation . . . would likely be diﬀ erent 
than it is in some way discernible by [you].”
Thus you satisfy CORNEA for asserting a conjunction even when one 
of its conjuncts does not—indeed, cannot—epistemically appear to you 
to be true. This result is bad enough by itself, especially in light of the 
evidential sense of “appears” that Wykstra invokes: how could your total 
evidence support a conjunction while failing to support one of its con-
juncts? How could you be evidentially bett er-oﬀ  with respect to (p & q) 
than you are with respect to p?8 But this particular defect betokens a quite 
general failure of closure. Every rational person who understands the rel-
evant concepts knows, at least tacitly, that a conjunction implies each of its 
conjuncts; thus satisfaction of CORNEA violates closure not just under 
implication but also under known implication: you satisfy CORNEA for 
“It appears that (p & q)” while necessarily failing it for “It appears that q” 
even though you know that (p & q) implies q.
Similarly implausible results are not far to fi nd. While you satisfy COR-
NEA for “It appears that R,” you cannot satisfy CORNEA for “It appears 
that I am not mistaken in now judging that R,” since it is not reasonable 
for you to believe the following: “Were I mistaken in now judging that R, 
things would look diﬀ erent to me.” On the contrary, if you were mistaken 
in that occurrent judgment, your mistake would arise from a cognitive 
situation relevantly like the one you are now having, namely, one caus-
ing you now to judge that R.9 In general, you can satisfy CORNEA for 
asserting “It appears that p” even when you fail the condition for assert-
ing “It appears that I am not mistaken in now judging that p,” a damning 
result given that “p” obviously implies the wide-scope negation “I am not 
mistaken in now judging that p.” Nor, fi nally, can Wykstra exploit the dif-
ference (if there is a principled diﬀ erence) between the “positive” appear-
ance-claim “It appears that p” and the “negative” appearance-claim “It 
appears that I am not mistaken in now judging that p” without by his own 
lights committ ing Swinburne’s Slip.
One might respond by emphasizing that CORNEA is only a necessary 
condition, not a suﬃ  cient condition, for being entitled to assert appearance-
claims: being so entitled may require the fulfi llment of further conditions 
as well. But our argument never assumes otherwise. We need not assume 
that CORNEA by itself entitles you to assert “It appears that (p & q)” while 
it precludes your asserting “It appears that p,” for some p and q. Nor need 
we assume that CORNEA by itself entitles you to assert “It appears that p” 
while it precludes your asserting “It appears that q” for some q you know 
is implied by p. In its present form, CORNEA certainly does nothing to 
discourage those two assumptions, but it does not imply them either.10 In-
stead, we urge the rejection of any evidential test which (i) you can pass for 
a conjunction while failing—indeed, necessarily failing—for one conjunct 
and (ii) you can pass for p while (necessarily) failing for some q you know 
to be implied by p. CORNEA is such a test. If atheistic arguments from evil 
fail, it is not because they violate Wykstra’s false constraint on the assertion 
of appearance-claims. Alas, a sensitive CORNEA is a major disability.
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NOTES
1. See Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Argu-
ments from Evil: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), pp. 73–93. Wykstra’s original target is Wil-
liam L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335–41.
2. Critical treatments include Keith Chrzan, “Debunking CORNEA,” In-
ternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987), pp. 171–77; Daniel How-
ard-Snyder, “Seeing Through CORNEA,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 32 (1992), pp. 25–49; and Jim Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” Philosophi-
cal Studies 114 (2003), pp. 253–77. For further invocation and defense of COR-
NEA, see Bruce Russell and Stephen Wykstra, “The ‘Inductive’ Argument 
from Evil: A Dialogue,” Philosophical Topics 16 (1988), pp. 133–60; Stephen John 
Wykstra, “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996), pp. 126–50; and Stephen Wykstra, “Stone-Ground CORNEA: A Rebut-
tal,” presented at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association, 24 April 2004.
3. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,” pp. 83, 84.
4. Ibid., p. 85.
5. Ibid., p. 87.
6. See Rowe, “The Problem of Evil,” p. 337.
7. According to the sensitivity condition, roughly, you know that p only 
if you would not believe that p if it were false that p.
8. This point is not to be confused with the harmless Bayesian result, ap-
parently overlooked by Stone (“Evidential Atheism,” p. 264), that a given piece 
of evidence can increase the probability of a conjunction without increasing the 
probability of each of its conjuncts and even while decreasing the probability 
of each of its conjuncts. We thank David Anderson for drawing our att ention 
to the latt er result.
9. In the closest possible worlds in which you genuinely but mistakenly 
now judge that you are reading (these worlds need not be close tout court), 
you are, say, dreaming or hallucinating that you are reading, and the illusion 
is evidently good enough to fool you. In claiming that you now judge that R, 
we presume that our merely broaching the topic suﬃ  ces to induce in you that 
occurrent judgment.
10. Wykstra himself sometimes leaves the impression, presumably un-
intended, that satisfying CORNEA is suﬃ  cient for legitimately asserting ap-
pearance-claims: “Seeing no elephant in a normal room, aft er looking hard, 
gives us good reason to believe no elephant is in the room” (Russell and Wykstra, “A 
Dialogue,” p. 143, emphasis added); “Looking around my garage and seeing 
no dog entitles me to conclude that none is present, but seeing no fl eas does not.” 
(Wykstra, “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments,” p. 126, emphasis added).
